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Abstract
This article examines a neglected structural transformation in European finance: the growing
importance of government debt as collateral for Europe’s repo markets, where banks borrow cash
against collateral. Seduced by the promises of repo market-driven financial integration, the EU
institutions and Member States encouraged private finance to generate its own architecture for
the European repo market in the early years of the euro, sidelining known problems about systemic
fragilities. These fragilities materialized after Lehman Brothers’ collapse and were exacerbated by
the ECB’s collateral policies. The European sovereign debt crisis shows that governments, just
like private asset issuers, can rapidly become vulnerable to repo pro-cyclicality and collateral
crises.
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Introduction
Since 2008, regulators have become increasingly concerned with two markets of systemic
importance for shadow banking: securitization and repo markets (FSB, 2012; Commis-
sion, 2012; ECB, 2013a). After Lehman Brothers’ collapse triggered a run on the repo
market (Gorton and Metrick, 2012; Constâncio, 2012), central banks across the world
expressed their surprise that such shadow markets had become systemic (see FSB,
2012; ECB, 2013a). For the ECB (2013a), the build-up of leverage in European finance
could be traced to ‘the growth of markets that are relatively “hidden” from regulators’, in-
cluding the European repo market where financial institutions borrow against collateral.
The European repo market has become structurally important for European private and
public finance. First, it tripled in volume between 2001 and 2008 to €6 trillion, reaching
the size of the US repo market (Hördahl and King, 2008; Constâncio, 2012). Second,
while dominated by large European banks, repo markets also involve cash-rich, non-bank
financial institutions (pension funds, insurance companies). In 2011, large European
banks were still funding 66 per cent of their assets in wholesale funding markets, twice
the level of US or Asian banks (Le Lesle, 2012). Third, the European repo market is struc-
turally intertwined with European government bond markets. Around 75 per cent of repo
transactions use government bonds as collateral (Hördahl and King, 2008). Fourth, the
quiet rise of repo markets has created new systemic actors (Constâncio, 2012). In 2012,
LCH Clearnet – a clearing house (or CCP) that stands between the two repo parties to
guarantee the exchange of collateral and cash – intermediated around €11 trillion of repos
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with government bonds monthly. By 2013, the ECB had put it on the list of financial
institutions to be supervised at the European level. Finally, central banks implement
monetary policy – including the ECB’s medium and long-term refinancing operations
(LTROs) – through repo operations, lending to banks against collateral (see ECB, 2015a).
Despite its systemic importance, the European repo market has attracted little scholarly
attention. With few exceptions, financial economists deal almost exclusively with the US
repo market (see Mancini et al., 2013; Boissel et al., 2014). The notable exception in
international political economy, Hardie and colleagues (2013) question the conventional
dichotomy between (US) market and (Europe) bank-based financial systems and call for
more work on banks’ activities in money and capital markets. To this end, they focus on
repo markets as a crucial dimension of market-based banking on both sides of the
Atlantic.
This article builds on and extends the contributions of Hardie and colleagues to show
not only that the European repo market has deeply altered European financial capitalism,
but also how it did this and who facilitated its deepening. We first show that EU institu-
tions and Member States actively supported the growth of European repo markets and
then trace the impact on European finance in times of crisis. We thus argue that the launch
of the euro was accompanied in European policy circles by growing support for a pan-
European repo market able to integrate the 15 national repo markets in place at the time.
Although EU policy-makers had grown aware of the systemic risks posed by repo mar-
kets (ECB, 2002a; also BIS, 1999; Praet and Herzberg, 2008), they nevertheless pushed
this process through. The 2002 Financial Collateral Directive committed Member States
to removing constraints on European banks’ cross-border use of repos, embedding the
(collateral) rules designed by market participants.
The idea of a European repo market fit well with the Commission’s integrationist po-
litical strategy that envisaged a single financial space (Jabko, 2006; Mügge, 2010;
Grossman and Leblond, 2011). It promised to solve the new liquidity challenges
confronting Member States in a euro government bond market that threatened to become
a de facto German bund zone. It also offered the ECB a solution to pressing questions of
the effectiveness of its monetary policy, on which its success and legitimacy as a
European institution rested (Enderlein and Verdun, 2009; Jones, 2009). For the ECB,
the European repo market could connect and integrate EMU securities markets, creating
the single financial space crucial for the transmission of interest rate decisions.
The ECB was uniquely positioned to energize the repo-driven financial integration be-
cause it creates euro liquidity through repo loans (ECB, 2015a). The ECB used its collat-
eral framework – the terms on which it lends to banks – to encourage repo market
participants to Europeanize sovereign collateral – that is, to treat all EMU sovereign
bonds as identical collateral. The ECB deflected criticism that it was granting preferential
treatment to ‘periphery’ governments by adopting market practices for managing collat-
eral. Thus, it could argue that its collateral policies accommodated, rather than influenced,
market views of (government) creditworthiness (Issing, 2005). In doing so, the ECB in-
troduced collateral practices that EMU national central banks had not used before, in full
knowledge that these could sharpen financial instability. After Lehman’s collapse, these
practices exacerbated the European sovereign bond crisis, until Draghi promised to pro-
vide liquidity to EMU government bond markets directly rather than through European
banks (see Buiter and Rahbari, 2012; de Grauwe and Ji, 2012).
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This article is organized as follows: first, we explain how repo markets work and trace
the fragilities underpinning collateral practices. Next, we explain how and why the Euro-
pean Commission, the ECB and Member States made the growth of the European repo
market possible. Finally, we examine the consequences of these decisions during the
European sovereign debt crisis and propose future avenues for research.
I. How Repos Work
The ‘repurchase agreement’ (often referred to as ‘repo’) has become a key financial de-
vice for contemporary capitalism. Though the legal and formal definitions of a repo trans-
action can make it sound quite complex, it most simply can be thought of as a (usually
short-term) secured loan. In a repo transaction one institution (the lender) agrees to buy
an asset from another institution (the borrower) and sell the asset back to the borrower
at a pre-agreed price on a pre-agreed future date (a day, a week or more). The lender takes
a fee (repo interest rate payment) for ‘buying’ the asset in question and can sell the asset
in the case that the borrower does not live up to the promise to repurchase it. The funda-
mental purpose of this circular transaction is to lend and borrow funds (and, in some
cases, securities). While financial institutions use it to raise finance, central banks use it
in monetary policy.
To illustrate, suppose Deutsche Bank (DB), acting as a borrower, sells assets to a buyer
(Allianz), acting as a lender, and commits to repurchasing those assets later (see Figure 1).
Allianz becomes the temporary owner of the assets, which also serve as collateral, and
Deutsche Bank has temporary access to cash funding. DB and Allianz also agree that
the purchase price is less than the market value of collateral (€100) – in this case a
5 per cent difference, known as a haircut. This provides a buffer against market fluctuations
and incentivizes borrowers to adhere to their promise to buy securities back. In our
example, DB provides €100 worth of collateral to ‘insure’ a loan of €95. When the repur-
chase takes place, DB pays €95 plus a ‘fee’ or interest payment in exchange for the assets it
had sold.
Figure 1: How General Collateral Repos Work
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For DB, the repo is an SFT (securities financing transaction). DB uses its portfolio of
marketable securities to raise short-term market funding without giving up the returns on
those assets. Because repos are structured legally as sales/repurchase (of collateral) agree-
ments and in economic terms as cash loans,1 Allianz does not assume the risks and
returns on the assets it owns temporarily, but rather has to send all returns on those assets
to DB. Financial institutions like to use repos to raise finance because the use of collateral
makes them at once less costly and less risky than borrowing from unsecured money
markets.
The presence of collateral also enables cash-rich non-bank institutions such as insur-
ance companies, pension funds and non-financial corporations to participate in money
markets (Pozsar, 2014). In our example, Allianz can use the repo to increase returns on
its cash; further, it can also reuse the collateral (‘repo it out’) if it needs cash before the
repurchase with DB is executed.
It should be noted that there are different kinds of repo agreements and the kind we
have just described is known as a GC (‘General Collateral’) repo. This is a funding-driven
repo. What makes GC repos distinctive is that the parties to the repo transaction agree
what kind of securities can be considered equivalent as collateral and accept any or all
those securities. In other words, any security that belongs to a certain agreed-upon cate-
gory will do. We visualize this in Figure 1: assuming the agreed-upon GC basket above
includes AA-rated Belgian and AAA German bonds, Allianz would accept €100 of
German bonds, or €100 of Belgian bonds, or any combination of the two. A typical repo
contract would allow DB to replace some or all of the bonds in the GC portfolio on any
day of the repo contract, as long as they are of equivalent value, as determined by the
so-called ‘mark-to-market’ technique, which requires that the value of collateral portfolio
be constantly updated according to market fluctuations.
Using mark-to-market is meant to protect lenders like Allianz from the failure of
counterparties like DB. In effect, through the repo contract Allianz becomes the legal
owner of collateral so that it can sell the collateral and recover the cash. For this system
to work without disruption, Allianz needs to ensure that the market value of its collateral
portfolio remains equal to the cash loan. This typically leads to a preference for
high-quality collateral, such as investment-grade government bonds. These trade in liquid
markets and generally experience less price volatility, therefore making the repo funding
cheaper. Indeed, before the global financial crisis, market haircuts on government
collateral were typically zero (see CGFS, 2010). Additionally, repos collateralized with
government bonds also enjoy preferential regulatory capital treatment (ECB, 2002a). In
the event that the market value of the collateral falls before the day of the repurchase,
the legal right to make a margin call protects Allianz. In other words, Allianz requires
DB to provide more collateral to make up for the shortfall in value. Conversely, if
collateral increases in price, Allianz returns the difference back to DB, allowing it to raise
further funding and increase leverage (Adrian and Shin, 2010).
Repo transactions have also altered the policy toolbox of contemporary central banks.
Repos have overtaken the traditional outright sale and purchase of assets as monetary
1 For legal differences between European and US repo markets, see «http://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-
Market-Practice/short-term-markets/Repo-Markets/frequently-asked-questions-on-repo/9-is-repo-in-europe-the-same-as-
repo-in-the-us/»
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policy instruments (see ECB, 2013b). Central banks use repos to meet banks’ demand for
reserves and thus influence interest rates on unsecured inter-bank money markets where
they implement monetary policy. Of critical importance, the central bank’s collateral
framework – the terms on which it lends to banks, including the potential use of haircuts,
collateral acceptability and margining practices – is not exogenous to how repo markets
work. Indeed, the following sections show that it can have systemic, if poorly understood,
effects on how repo markets treat and manage collateral, on liquidity in collateral markets
and on banks’ ability to preserve access to (repo) market funding in crisis (Whelan, 2014;
CGFS, 2015).
Repo Practices and Financial Instability: Collateral in Times of Stress
Central banks began to worry about repo markets after the 1997 Asian crisis. The CGFS
(Committee on the Global Financial System) set up a Working Group on Collateral,
whose members included central banks from Europe, North America and Asia. Its re-
search explored how collateral practices – mark-to-market, margin calls, haircuts – had
exacerbated systemic tensions (BIS, 1999; Domanski and Neumann, 2001). At the core
of repo fragilities, policy-makers discovered, was the ‘illusion’ of liquidity that lured
banks into believing that they could continuously create, and have access to, abundant li-
quidity via repo markets.
During good times, repo markets ‘lubricate’ liquidity in the securities markets that pro-
vide collateral. The more banks rely on repos for funding and leverage, the more collateral
is necessary (Adrian and Shin, 2010). The repo-driven demand for securities (collateral)
increases trading and liquidity in those securities markets. Yet in times of crisis, this li-
quidity dynamic can rapidly turn out fragile.
To illustrate, suppose that the highly leveraged DB, funded with short-term repos, is
suddenly unable to repurchase collateral from Allianz. Allianz, and other institutions that
lent to DB via repos, have no choice but to sell collateral. This in turn pushes collateral
prices down and reduces collateral market liquidity, triggering further margin calls on
repo funding, and further asset sales. A funding liquidity problem (for DB) turns into a
(collateral) market liquidity problem, eroding confidence in asset valuations. As uncer-
tainty proliferates, cash lenders change the terms of repo loans, only accepting high-
quality collateral and/or imposing substantially higher haircuts. Thus, tightening collateral
conditions (higher haircuts, narrower range of acceptable collateral) may lead to a li-
quidity spiral: lower liquidity in collateral markets, more margin calls, more funding
problems, more asset sales, lower liquidity (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; also
BIS, 1999).
Thus, collateral practices simultaneously affect financial institutions reliant on repos
and the issuers of assets used as collateral. Rather than issuers’ credibility, collateral li-
quidity depends on ‘whether vulnerable counterparts have substantial positions that need
liquidating’ (Praet and Herzberg, 2008, p. 23). Funding difficulties for leveraged
(shadow) banks can generate sudden stops in collateral markets.
As early as 2002, the ECB recognized the relevance of fragile collateral practices for
European finance. It pointed to large European banks – headquartered in the UK, France
and Germany – that were leaving behind the close, informational-intensive relationships
with retail customers and turning instead to market-based activities (ECB, 2002a; also
Banking on bonds 5
© 2015 The Author(s) JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies © 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Hardie et al., 2013). The increasing reliance on risk-sensitive market funding, the ECB
warned, meant that European banks would run on each other in repo markets.
Paradoxically, however, the analysis did not translate into policy actions. Central
banks did not ask how to ‘design out’ collateral fragilities, or how a financial system in-
creasingly organized around market liquidity mattered for central banks’ crisis interven-
tions, traditionally designed to address banks’ funding liquidity problems via lender of
last resort (see Mehrling, 2012). Rather, the ECB threw its weight behind the European
Commission’s Financial Collateral directive that gave market participants free rein in de-
signing collateral rules.
Dominated by large European banks (who together generated around 80 per cent of
repo volumes), the European repo market grew rapidly under such auspicious conditions.
Outstanding stocks tripled between 2001 and 2008 (Figure 2). In cumulative (flow) terms,
the ECB (2015b) survey showed, repo transactions reached €25 trillion annually by 2008
– almost double the volumes in the unsecured money market segment where banks tradi-
tionally lend to each other (and where the ECB implements interest rate decisions). Such
differences between stock and flow volumes highlight the short-term nature of repo
markets.
In contrast to the US, European repo market participants could draw on a broad range
of sovereign debt: Ireland, Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain together supplied around 25
per cent of sovereign European collateral by June 2008 (see Figure 2). Italy alone, with
one of the world’s largest sovereign debt markets, accounted for around 11 per cent of
collateral in European repos.
The next sections explore how the large European banks dominating the repo market
were able to mobilize broad political support from the EU institutions and Member States.
II. The European Commission: Market-based Governance and the Deepening of
European Economic Integration
The European integration scholarship highlights the Commission’s crucial role in the lib-
eralization of capital flows and EMU. Since the 1980s, the Commission had successfully
Figure 2: Government-issued Collateral in European Repo Markets, EUR Billions.
Source: ICMA statistics
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enlisted broad support for a rapid, profound transformation of European financial markets
and the institutional structures governing them (Jabko, 2006). European banks with
international ambitions were important allies, exerting pressure on their governments to
overcome domestic opposition from financial institutions that stood to lose market share
(Mügge, 2010).
The repo market fit perfectly this political strategy that invoked the appealing vision of
a single financial space, further cementing the alliance between the Commission,
European banks and technocracies. Regarding the repo market, this alliance became
visible in 1996, when the Commission summoned a group of financial market experts
to give advice on financial market integration. Chaired by Alberto Giovannini, the group
included private financial institutions, influential expert groups such as the European
Financial Market Lawyers’ Group or the International Swaps and Derivatives Association
(Keijser, 2006, p. 62) and representatives from the European Commission and ECB.
Critical for our discussion, the group’s 1999 report concluded that:
There are many areas where the introduction of the single currency alone cannot be
sufficient to induce the degree of integration and efficiency of financial markets that is
needed for the development of the European economy. […] In an area characterized by
a single currency, old rules and market architectures may be unsuited to the task and be-
come instead the main obstacles to the attainment of a higher degree of efficiency. The
repo market is a perfect illustration of this problem. (The Giovaninni Group, 1999, p. 1)
In line with this diagnosis, the report proposed the vision of a Europe where banks
would freely move collateral and cash across borders and where market practices for
managing collateral risk and legal and fiscal frameworks would be harmonized. Crucially,
the report promised that an integrated repo market would maintain the momentum for
financial integration that EMU had created, but could not deliver on its own. The interac-
tions between repo and collateral markets would increase liquidity in securities markets
used as collateral, paving the way for the genuine integration of EU capital markets.
The Commission quickly turned the report’s main recommendations into institutional
reality. The 2002 Collateral Directive provided a unified legal framework for the cross-
border use of collateral which steamrolled the domestic institutions that governed national
repo markets, while refraining from EU-level regulatory interventions or supervisory
oversight. By stressing that market practices would strengthen financial stability, the
Commission effectively institutionalized pure market-based governance in this area.
Member States lend support to this market-based integrationist strategy for reasons that
we turn to below.
EMU Member States and the Europeanization of Sovereign Collateral
The introduction of the euro was expected to create a euro government bond market that
would challenge the US Treasuries’ status as international benchmark (Galati and
Tsatsaronis, 2003). The convergence in borrowing costs for EMU governments and the
increasing presence of investors from outside Europe (see Andritzky, 2012) lent plausibil-
ity to such ambitions. In parallel, however, EMU governments found themselves compet-
ing with each other as they lost the privilege of issuing risk-free in their currency’ (Galati
and Tsatsaronis, 2003). This became a competition for liquidity, a challenge for small
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Member States who saw investors, no longer concerned about exchange rate and inflation
risk, turn to liquid bond markets of large Member States (see ECB, 2000, 2006).
It is important to recall that Member States had bought into the Commission’s promise
that EMU would counterbalance the asymmetries of the European Monetary System and
diffuse the threat, often materialized, of currency crises (Jabko, 2006). Having left behind
the threat of a de facto deutsche mark zone, governments worried that the Euro govern-
ment bond market would become a German bund zone. As Bunds were increasingly used
to price other EMU government bonds, investor preference for highly liquid German
bonds would erode the liquidity of their bonds and raise borrowing costs (see Trampusch,
2015).2 With EMU, Germany did not only fashion the ECB after the Bundesbank but
quietly became the de facto EMU safe asset issuer, a country whose ‘paper sells itself’.3
Furthermore, during the political tensions accompanying the 2005 French vote on the
European Constitution, Member States understood that investors would quickly exploit
these asymmetries. In ‘spread widening’ or ‘euro-break up’ trades, leveraged investors
sold low-rated government bonds (Greece) and bought high-rated government bonds
(Germany).4 Although investors did not take positions large enough to reverse the yield
convergence in Euro government bond markets, the euro-break up trade provided early
warnings that Member States with weaker finances may come under speculative pressure
in times of crisis, and that such pressure could only be addressed by the ECB. Thus, the
Financial Times warned that ‘positioning against weak euro governments would be a one
way bet’ for hedge funds and macro-traders unless the ECB intervened to buy those gov-
ernment bonds and ‘crush short-sellers’ (Dizard, 2005).
An integrated European repo market could address such liquidity predicaments. To un-
derstand why Member States bought into this promise, it is important to recall how GC
repos function. The mechanics of a GC repo – where market participants agree on a set
of securities that are equivalent as collateral – would help with the further integration
of European government bond markets if banks agreed to create GC baskets that included
all EMU government debt. Lower-rated governments would also benefit from rapid repo
growth, as large banks looked for collateral beyond their home government. In doing so,
banks would Europeanize sovereign collateral, creating a ‘synthetic’ eurozone high-
quality collateral asset that included all European sovereigns.
The alliance between the Commission and European banks thus sold the European
repo market as the solution to the liquidity challenges that EMU was creating for
European governments. This solidified the broader political strategy to push for more
market-based governance at European level (see Jabko, 2006). Furthermore, banks used
governments’ liquidity concerns to relax the constraints on their expansion strategies. A
European repo market would reduce dependence on the fiscal strategies of home govern-
ments. Indeed, a common concern among bankers in the early 2000s was that fiscally
conservative governments were not creating enough highly rated debt to be used as
collateral, a tendency potentially sharper in EMU if the Stability and Growth Pact was
to prove successful. A European repo market would effectively manufacture high-quality
2 ‘Two minutes that shook Europe’s bond markets’, Financial Times, 9 September 2004.
3 ‘Schleif to leave Germany’s Finance Agency’, Financial Times, 1 March 2005.
4 ‘Playing spread poker with Europe’s bonds’, Financial Times, 2 May 2005.
Daniela Gabor and Cornel Ban8
© 2015 The Author(s) JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies © 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
collateral out of previously illiquid and/or lower-rated EMU government debt on the same
funding terms with German debt, without additional regulatory burden.
By 2008, this promise had come true. Large repo market participants (LCH Clearnet,
Eurex) introduced euro GC collateral baskets that included all eurozone sovereigns (see
Hördahl and King, 2008; also BIS, 2011). Banks could raise cross-border funding on
equal terms against A-rated Greek or AAA German government bond collateral. Even
repo actors in the same jurisdiction increasingly used foreign government collateral (see
Table 1). Thus, the share of ‘home’ collateral declined from 63 per cent in 2001 to 31
per cent in 2008, while cross-border repos increased their share from 36 per cent to 48
per cent in the same period.
The country breakdown in banks’ portfolios of government debt captures the distinc-
tive portfolio strategies of large ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ banks (see Figure 3), closely
reflecting their business models (see Liikanen Report, 2012). Banks in Greece, Spain,
Italy and Portugal, who typically traded with each other inside national borders to support
traditional lending or had foreign subsidiaries reliant on their hosts’ funding markets,
remained ‘loyal’ to home governments. In contrast, market-based banks in ‘core’ coun-
tries emerged as cross-border creators of liquidity by increasingly holding, and using as
collateral, foreign government debt.
Italy and other ‘periphery’ governments benefited from increased demand from
European banks, which built geographically diversified portfolios of government debt
that could be used in GC portfolios to fund their global expansion strategy. In turn, banks
in ‘periphery’ countries diversified less, since they could use the debt of the home
sovereign as collateral to borrow from, say, German banks.
While governments were oblivious to the emerging sovereign bank interdependencies
and the attending systemic risks, the ECB’s (2006) work on fiscal policy noted that
investors created perverse incentives for governments to increase public debt in order to
enjoy the EMU liquidity premium. Nevertheless, the ECB did not connect this ‘perverse’
liquidity effect to repo markets, for reasons that we explore next.
III. The ECB: Mandate Politics and Struggles Over Legitimacy
The ECB saw the European repo integration as an opportunity to improve the conditions
under which it could fulfil its price stability mandate. Its political legitimacy in concen-
trating monetary powers at European level rested on its ability to deliver price stability,
an ‘output legitimacy’ (Jones, 2009). The economics of its mandate required a well-
functioning transmission mechanism, where banks and financial markets across Eurozone
respond in a similar fashion to interest rate decisions (ECB, 2002b, 2006). Thus, the ECB
Table 1: Repo Collateral and Counterparty, Europe, (share of total)
2001 2008 2009
Collateral National 63 31 36
Cross-border (from euroarea) 27 65 59
Counterparty National 43 31 32
Cross-border (from euroarea) 36 48 44
Source: compiled from the ECB’s Euro Money Market Surveys
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viewed the single European financial space as fundamental to its success as a European
institution. The integrated repo market, ‘indifferent to the location of securities and
counterparties’ (ECB, 2002b, p. 64), could accelerate its creation.
Due to its role as creator of euro liquidity via repo operations, the ECB was in a unique
position to support the European repo market. Since its inception, the ECB had accepted a
broader range of collateral than other central banks, which typically focused on govern-
ment debt to protect themselves against credit risk (CGFS, 2015). This is usually ex-
plained as a consequence of historical, institutional and structural differences in a
monetary union. The broad range of acceptable private and public assets would ensure
that the ECB’s collateral framework preserved market neutrality, that is, that the ECB’s
loans against collateral would not have a substantive influence on the markets where col-
lateral trade (see ECB, 2013b; ECB, 2015a).
Yet in practice, the ECB was well aware that its collateral framework could influ-
ence the way that private repo markets treated EMU government bonds and securities
in general. Moreover, it was prepared to use its collateral policies to influence repo
market participants, and thus change liquidity conditions in EMU government bond
markets:
… the way market participants perceive the different national characteristics of securities
accepted as collateral in repo transactions constitutes one aspect of the fragmentation of
the euro area repo market. For instance, given the different credit ratings of euro area
governments, there might be differences in the terms of repo transactions (i.e. repo rate,
haircut) with government securities as collateral, depending on the country. The same ap-
plies to the differences in the liquidity of government securities. Market integration
would benefit from the extension of a euro GC approach, enabling participants to put se-
curities with similar, although not the same, characteristics in the same basket. Eurosystem
collateralised operations are an example of this approach. (ECB, 2002b, p. 68)
Figure 3: Share of Home Sovereign in Banks’ Sovereign Bond Portfolios, 2010.
Source: European Banking Authority.
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Thus, the ECB played an important role in the Europeanization of sovereign collateral.
It created a euro GC basket that included all EMU government bonds in the same liquidity
category, encouraging private repo actors to follow suit. By 2008, several large CCPs
(Eurex, LCH Clearnet) had done so. Paradoxically, although the ECB (2006) complained
that investors were losing their disciplining function in government bond markets due to
their obsession with liquidity, its financial integration agenda saw it nurturing that
obsession.
The ECB breathed life into the European repo market, yet it did not achieve this with-
out trade-offs. Member States had agreed to renounce their currencies if the independent
ECB would ‘maximize collective utility’ by conducting, in a depoliticized fashion, mon-
etary policy (Enderlein and Verdun, 2009, p. 11). Yet its collateral policy was subject to
political contestation that questioned its independence. Indeed, Buiter and Sibert (2005)
pointed out that the politics of monetary policy in EMU resided not in interest rate deci-
sions, but in the ECB’s collateral policies. In their view, these policies encouraged private
finance to treat AAA-rated Germany and A-rated Greece as sovereign issuers of similar
creditworthiness, an implicit ‘subsidy’ to lower-rated Member States that weakened fiscal
discipline.
The ECB had prepared for such objections by adopting the risk practices of repo mar-
ket participants: daily mark-to-market, margin calls and haircuts (Issing, 2005). In doing
so, the ECB could argue that its collateral policies had no substantive impact on govern-
ment bond markets for two reasons. First, banks had little incentive to use government
bonds to borrow from the central bank, since its repos carried higher haircuts than private
repo transactions (where haircuts were zero for government debt) and ECB-held collateral
could not be re-used in the repo market. Second, the ECB stressed that its collateral pol-
icies accommodated market views of credit quality. If markets distrusted Germany, its
bonds would fall in market value. Like any repo market participant, the ECB would mark
German collateral to market and make margin calls. Rather than disrupt, the ECB argued
that its collateral policies reinforced private market discipline.
By trying to strike a delicate balance between its financial integration priorities and its
independence, the ECB made a radical departure from how central banks in EMU coun-
tries had previously managed lending operations (see Table 2). These central banks rarely
marked to market and never made margin calls when lending to banks (except the Dutch
central bank), and few used initial haircuts.
It is plausible to suggest that the ECB simply converged with the practice of large cen-
tral banks, such as the Bank of England or the Federal Reserve (Whelan, 2014). However,
as argued above, the ECB fully understood that the private risk rules it adopted had
repeatedly destabilized financial markets throughout the late 1990s. Furthermore, the
ECB’s (2015a) arguments for adopting market risk practices – as protection against
credit, market and liquidity risk (ECB, 2015a) – are debatable. Richard Comotto, of the
repo industry association, reminds us that repo market participants mark collateral to
market, impose haircuts and make margin calls to ensure urgent access to liquidity.5 A
central bank is not subject to the same liquidity pressures since it is the only institution
that can create official liquidity. If the borrower defaults, it does not need to sell collateral.
5 See https://icmacentre.wordpress.com/2014/10/07/asking-the-unthinkable-do-central-banks-really-need-to-take-haircuts-
when-lending/
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If it did, it would trigger fire sales and sharpen instability – as the ECB (2015a) acknowl-
edges. Rather, the central bank can afford to wait until collateral matures, earning interest
and eventually receiving the cash back from issuers. Otherwise, the central bank acts like
a shadow bank (see FSB, 2012), replicating the ‘cyclical behavior of private sector margin
and haircuts’ (CGFS, 2010, p. 21), and thus sharpening the systemic fragilities that it is
meant to contain in the first place.
In sum, the ECB’s decision to adopt market practices for managing collateral was a
political decision aimed to shield its independence from the problematic politics of its
collateral framework. The crisis would come to test this decision.
Collateral Damage in the European Sovereign Debt Crisis
The financial crisis which erupted in 2007 has fragmented the GC repo market in
Eurozone government bonds … There is consequently a German GC market, a French
GC market and so on, but there is no longer a eurozone GC market, except for one-
day repos, where credit risk is minimal. (European Repo Council, 2013)
While US scholars and policy-makers have dedicated close attention to the run on US
repo markets following Lehman Brothers’ collapse (Gorton and Metrick, 2012;
Krishnamurthy et al., 2014) and the FSB (2012) put repo markets on its shadow banking
agenda, scholarship on the systemic fragilities in European repo markets is in its infancy.
Although the crisis reversed the Europeanization of sovereign collateral, as suggested in
the quote above, the few studies dealing with European repo markets (Mancini et al.,
2013; Boissel et al., 2014) do not engage with the impact on collateral markets.
The paucity of research on this topic is striking considering that by 2012, Portugal,
Greece and Ireland provided 0.1 per cent of total repo collateral, sharply down from the
3.5 per cent share in 2008 (see Figure 2), and that Eurex (a large CCP) eliminated GIP
government bonds from its GC Pooling basket (Mancini et al., 2013). Repo participants
also reduced the use of German government bonds, for the opposite reason: in times of
uncertainty, investors become reluctant to part with highly liquid assets.
Thus, the insight from the US-based literature on repo markets that government bonds
preserve their high-quality collateral status in crisis, when repo lenders stop accepting
privately issued securities, does not apply to Europe (Pozsar, 2014). The eurozone crisis
shows that governments are also vulnerable to repo market tensions because the private
rules that govern collateral and the incentives of systemic repo market participants are
inherently destabilizing.
In the eurozone crisis, Member States faced not only destabilizing repo market dynam-
ics, but also a central bank whose collateral policies were pro-cyclical at critical junctures.
Table 2: Collateral Practices, Central Banks, Before and Since the Euro.
Margining practices Belgium France Germany Italy Holland ECB UK US
Mark to market No No No No Weekly Daily Daily Daily
Margin call No No No No Rare Yes Yes Yes
Initial haircut Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: compiled from BIS (1999) and central bank websites.
Note: Data for eurozone countries is for June 1998, for the others June 2015.
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This clashes with the conventional description of the ECB’s crisis interventions, which
emphasizes that its measures helped stabilize repo and collateral markets (ECB, 2010;
Drudi et al., 2012; BIS, 2011). The narrative goes like this: throughout 2008 and 2009,
the ECB acted counter-cyclically by extending the pool of eligible collateral (lowering
the credit rating threshold from A! to BBB!), a measure meant to help leveraged
European banks facing severe funding problems (ECB, 2015a). This allowed banks to
take ‘bad’ collateral to the ECB’s long-term lending facilities and use high-quality col-
lateral in private repos. Policy action contained potential runs in periphery collateral mar-
kets, restoring confidence in the collateral qualities of GIIPs government debt. The
several LTROs enabled banks to fund government debt portfolios, increasing demand
and therefore liquidity in those markets. The OMT finally dealt with unfounded fears
of a eurozone break-up in 2012.
A repo lens complicates this account. When examined through collateral practices, the
ECB’s crisis interventions were often pro-cyclical. At critical moments, the central bank
made margin calls, raised haircuts and tightened collateral standards. Indeed, in those
moments the ECB behaved just like a private repo market participant – a ‘shadow bank’
– that disregards the systemic implications of its collateral practices.
Thus, in April 2010, shortly after Standard and Poor’s downgraded Greece below
investment grade status, the ECB announced that it would introduce graduated haircuts
on lower-quality assets starting from January 2011 (see Table 3), a necessary step towards
‘normalizing’ monetary policy (Gabor, 2014). While the new haircut rules initially
appeared to exempt government bonds, in the August 2010 communication, the ECB
indicated that sovereign collateral rated BBB+ and lower would also incur higher
haircuts. This decision dealt a heavy blow to low-rated governments, increasing the cost
of using their government bonds as collateral.
Afterwards, the ECB exercised the ‘power to threaten the banking system’ (Whelan,
2014, p. 17) and periphery governments by changing the acceptability criteria and
haircuts on lower-rated government collateral (Greek, Irish, Portuguese) at its discretion,
without revealing the haircuts it applied on these bonds, or the potential negative effects
this would have on banks and liquidity more general.
Paradoxically, at that time, the ECB (2011) and the Commission were advocating a
move away from policies based on credit ratings. The EU institutions worried about





AAA to A! BBB+ to BBB!
before July 2013 since July 2013 before Jan 2011 Jan 2011–July 2013 since July 2013
0–1 0.5 0.5 5 5.5 6
1–3 1.5 1 5 6.5 7
3–5 2.5 1.5 5 7.5 9
5–7 3 2 5 8 10
7–10 4 3 5 9 11.5
>10 5.5 5 5 10.5 13
Source: ECB. Data for fixed coupon assets.
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‘cliff-effects’, a well-documented phenomenon whereby ratings downgrades trigger fire
sales. Fire sales of collateral may quickly mutate into further funding problems for banks
reliant on private repo funding (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). This is why the FSB’s
(2010, p. 3) stressed that ‘central bank policies should avoid mechanistic approaches that
could lead to unnecessarily abrupt and large changes in the eligibility of financial instru-
ments and the level of haircuts that may exacerbate cliff effects’. Its minimum haircut
proposals explicitly reject the use of credit ratings (see FSB, 2012).
Yet it is these mechanistic approaches that the ECB relied on in 2010. The timing
could not have been worse, as uncertainty about collateral liquidity threatened to spread
beyond Greece. The haircut decisions thus tightened collateral standards in a pro-cyclical
fashion, just as repo market participants do during periods of market stress (Domanski
and Neumann, 2001; CGFS, 2010; Gorton and Metrick, 2012). Indeed, Whelan (2014,
p. 4) argues that the ECB was ‘generally more aggressive in its risk control measures than
any other major central banks’.
However, this is not only a story about pro-cyclical haircut adjustments. The difficul-
ties faced by ‘periphery’ sovereigns and banks were further magnified by the use of mark-
to-market and margin calls in the ECB’s LTROs. Consider the implications for Greek and
Spanish banks. Both had highly concentrated portfolios of home government bonds, a
strategy sanctioned by the ECB’s earlier efforts to Europeanize collateral. As tensions
eased in 2009, the ECB’s mark-to-market and daily margin calls created incentives for
banks to use LTROs in order to buy (home) government bonds, push up prices and make
margin calls on ECB repos (see Figure 4). By June 2009, the two banking systems were
funding 8 per cent and 2 per cent, respectively, of total assets with ECB’s LTRO repo
loans, some against home sovereign collateral.
Yet market tensions in 2010–12, underpinned by the ECB’s tightening of collateral
standards, increased the costs of using lower rated sovereign bonds as collateral. The en-
suing fall in market price of those government bonds meant that banks had to find addi-
tional collateral to meet the ECB’s margin calls. Indeed, throughout 2011 and early 2012,
Figure 4: Margin Calls, ECB Repos (Including LTROs, Millions of EUR).
Source: www.ecb.int
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the ECB’s margin calls increased in magnitude (see Figure 4). Paradoxically, at the time,
Vitor Constâncio (2012, p. 2), the ECB vice-president, noted that ‘the decline in collateral
values translates in additional collateral calls possibly compounded with higher haircuts
and margins requirements. A system in which financial institutions rely substantially on
secured lending tends to be more pro-cyclical than otherwise’. Yet he failed to notice that
his concerns also applied to the ECB’s repo loans.
Confronted with margin calls from the ECB and market participants, banks needed to
raise funding in private repo markets against high-quality collateral such as German
bunds, or sell lower-rated government bonds. Indeed, in an attempt to pre-empt double
exposure to the counterparty and to collateral, repo participants often refused to lend
against collateral issued by governments where borrowers were headquartered: ‘an Irish
bank pledging Italian debt as collateral is less desirable from a credit perspective than
an Irish bank pledging AAA-rated security with no correlation to the European debt crisis.
Where firms are declining PIIGS debt, collateral pledgers are sometimes faced with
having to offer higher quality collateral’ (SLT, 2011, p. 12).
Systemic repo actors, alongside the ECB, also helped create a perfect storm for
‘periphery’ governments between 2010 and 2012. Consider the example of LCH
Clearnet. As the ECB promised to ‘get tough’ on periphery sovereign collateral and
‘zombie’ banks addicted to its liquidity, LCH announced a new sovereign risk framework
for its repo operations in October 2010. It introduced a trigger that measured the spread
between the yield on a ten-year government bond and a benchmark basket of AAA-rated
sovereign bonds. LCH would hike haircuts when that spread went above 450 basis points
for five consecutive days, disregarding the destabilizing effects that its arbitrary spread
could inflict on lower-rated EMU governments. When LCH Clearnet raised haircuts on
a lower-rated sovereign bond, demand would shift to AAA sovereigns that benefit from
‘safe-asset’ status (Germany). This lowered yields on AAA sovereign debt and increased
spreads against lower-rated government bonds. Thus, LCH Clearnet’s collateral practices
and the speculative ‘euro break-up trade’ described earlier would reinforce each other to
the detriment of periphery government bonds, and the benefit of German bunds.
LCH Clearnet first applied that framework to Irish government bonds in November
2010. Irish yields had been rising, although the government had no immediate refinancing
needs, and enjoyed investment-grade rating. However, the ECB had been pressing the
Irish government to reduce Irish banks’ dependency on its emergency liquidity, viewed
as an obstacle to the exit strategy (Brown and Atkins, 2010). As LCH repeatedly
increased haircuts on Irish sovereign collateral from 0 to 45 per cent over three weeks,
a German bank could only get €55 of funding for every €100 of Irish collateral. Faced
with lower liquidity in its sovereign debt market, Ireland had no choice but to ask for
IMF support. Portugal went through the same process in early 2011, when LCH increased
haircuts to 80 per cent (see Bank of England, 2011). By December 2011, LCH no longer
accepted Irish and Portuguese government bonds as collateral. The repo industry associ-
ation stressed that such haircut policies propagated stress in the GIIPS sovereign bond
markets in 2011 and 2012.6
6 According to ICMA: ‘Strict haircutting by CCPs arguably had such an effect on Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain
in 2011’ see http://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/short-term-markets/Repo-Markets/fre-
quently-asked-questions-on-repo/27-what-does-a-ccp-do-what-are-the-pros-and-cons/
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From a collateral angle, the ECB’s OMT was a game-changer precisely because it put
an end to uncertainty about the collateral qualities of EMU sovereign debt. The timing of
the OMT also becomes clearer. Early in 2012, repo market participants became increas-
ingly concerned about the collateral qualities of Italian government bonds, the second
largest supplier of collateral for European repo markets. An Italian default would have
obliterated the European repo market, European banking and the euro with it. It is at this
juncture that the ECB finally decided to act in a decisively counter-cyclical fashion. While
the LTROs were inherently pro-cyclical through the collateral policies attached, the OMT
programme committed to preserve liquidity in government bond markets through direct
market interventions.
Conclusion
This paper advances scholarship on how finance constrains state sovereignty during crises
(Streeck, 2014) and on the importance of repo markets for market-based banking (Hardie
et al., 2013). It highlights the critical importance of an understudied shift in
state–financial market relations in Europe: the linkages between repo and sovereign bond
markets. As a result, the standing of a sovereign in financial markets now hinges on the
collateral quality of its debt, which in turn depends on (shadow) banks’ expansion
strategies, their vulnerability to short-term funding shocks, the portfolio decisions of
resident and non-resident bondholders, the collateral policies of private repo actors and
central banks. In this new environment, European sovereigns’ access to finance moves
with the cyclical rhythms of (shadow) banking.
Specific policy decisions of the European Commission and the ECB that led to the
organic links between repo and sovereign bond markets reflected not only their ideas
about European integration or the politics of their mandates (Jabko, 2006; Grossman
and Leblond, 2011; Enderlein and Verdun, 2009; Jones, 2009), but also the dynamics
of policy coalitions forged between EU institutions and expert networks clustered
around private finance (Mügge, 2010; Woll, 2013; Tsingou and Moschella, 2013).
Our insights open several avenues for future research. First, scholars should
re-examine common wisdoms about (fiscal) policy agency in a world where collateral
becomes increasingly important. Indeed, a survey undertaken by the Italian Treasury
suggests that Member States have become concerned about the implications of pro-
cyclical repo markets for public debt management (Canatta, 2012), and potentially more
aware of the underlying asymmetries in the European repo–sovereign debt nexus that
benefit high-rated Member States. The rapid transformation in public debt management
(see Trampusch, 2015) should be explicitly considered in relationship to repo markets,
with close analytical attention paid to the changing relationship between debt managers,
Treasuries and central banks. Furthermore, it would be interesting to explore
how/whether this re-think will shape the Juncker Commission’s Capital Markets Union
plans to transform shadow banking – including repo markets – into market-based finance.
Second, future research should engage with questions of output legitimacy in a market-
based banking system (see Jones, 2009). The neglected politics of the ECB’s collateral
framework played an important role in the European crisis, while the OMT promised
liquidity backstops to government bond markets, but conditional on structural reforms.
Furthermore, research could explore, in a comparative fashion, how large central banks
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may be able to solve the trade-off between protecting their balance sheet and the financial
(in)stability implications of their collateral policies.
Finally, research should explore the strategies of repo market participants in regulatory
struggles at national, regional and international levels. While early in the crisis regulators
agreed that it was imperative to reform market practices for managing collateral (see FSB,
2012), we know little about why the FSB dropped government bond collateral from its
repo regulation by 2013. Political economists have also left unexplained the contrast
between the US and Europe: while the US Treasury has proposed measures to delink
the collateral function of government bonds from leveraged activities, EU governments
have abandoned their plans to include repos in the Financial Transactions Tax. This
should invite more work on the political processes through which repo lobbies have been
successful in rolling back initiatives to regulate repo markets.
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